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This paper studies the propensity of firms to commit to disclose information that is subse-
quently biased, in the presence of other firms also issuing potentially biased information. An
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of firms’commitment to
disclose information. Specifically, we combine following aspects of firms’disclosure decisions.
First, firms bias the information they disclose to change prices in a favorable way. Second,
the extent to which firms bias their disclosure depends on the information disclosed by other
firms. Third, firms are more likely to commit to disclose information when there is a larger
value to managing prices in the future. That is, we investigate the propensity of a firm to
commit to disclose information in conjunction with subsequently biasing the disclosure, in the
presence of other firms also issuing potentially biased reports. Our main contribution comes
from investigating a setting with multiple firms that choose whether to commit to disclose.
By treating the number of firms that commit to disclose as endogenous, we derive predictions
on how various exogenous variables, such as cash flow uncertainty and the quality of firms’
private information, affect the number of reports provided by the firms in an industry.
In our model, we extend Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) in that we allow multiple firms to
commit to disclosing information ex ante but have discretion ex post about the exact infor-
mation that is disclosed.1 That is, a firm voluntarily commits to disclose information prior to
receiving it and independent of its content, but can bias the disclosed information. While our
setting seems to be descriptive of firm’s commitment to voluntary disclosure, it extends to
certain kinds of mandatory disclosures. For example, firms choose their exposure to manda-
tory disclosure regimes when they choose whether and where to list, or whether to adopt
IFRS. Prior analytical literature commonly assumes a commitment to disclose; furthermore,
1 This is in contrast to ex post disclosure, which is disclosed conditional on its information content.
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empirical evidence suggests that this is consistent with various voluntary disclosure choices.2
We summarize the predictions from our model as follows. With an exogenous number of
firms that disclose, the extent of bias in disclosure is lower when more reports are disclosed
and/or when firms’cash flows are more highly correlated. The reason for these results is
straightforward: the more information that is available to investors, the less they rely on a
firm’s own report to estimate the firm’s future prospects. As the weight that investors assign
to a firm’s report in its own price decreases, the benefit of introducing bias decreases, and
hence expected bias decreases.
With an endogenous number of firms that disclose, we find that fewer firms commit to
disclose when the prior uncertainty about firms’cash flows decreases, or firms’cash flows
have a higher correlation. In our model, prior uncertainty about cash flows captures the
market’s demand about information and the quality of firms’private information. A lower
demand for information naturally leads to fewer firms issuing reports. The result concerning
the correlation across firms’cash flows can be explained as follows. An increase in correlation,
ceteris paribus, increases the amount of information investors have about a firm’s cash flow,
and thus reduces the extent to which firms are able to influence prices by issuing a biased
report. Hence, while the costs of issuing a report remain constant, the benefits decrease and
fewer firms commit to disclose. This also leads us to predict that in a given industry, the
firms whose reports are least informative about the industry are the most likely firms to
issue one. Finally, allowing the number of firms that disclose to be endogenous introduces a
countervailing force to some of the results from the prior literature: for example, the extent
2 For analytical literature, see, e.g., Goex and Wagenhofer (2009), Cheynel and Levine (2012), Gao and
Liang (2013), and Michaeli (2014). For empirical literature, see, e.g., Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2011)
and Tang (2012). Li, Wasley, and Zimmerman (2012) estimates that 63% of management forecasts in their
sample are “released to lower the firm’s cost of capital”and thus purposefully ex ante.
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of bias in disclosed information is constant over changes in the uncertainty about firms’cash
flows.
For the main part, the theory-based literature on reporting bias has limited itself to
studying bias when only a single firm issues a report.3 Most related is Fischer and Verrecchia
(2000) where a firm discloses a report but investors are uncertain about the firm’s incentive
to manage earnings. The firm is therefore able to “fool the market” as investors cannot
perfectly anticipate the firm’s bias.4 This gives rise to a value of disclosure to firms ex
ante because the firm anticipates that it can successfully react to its future preferences by
managing share prices.
While the firm in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) always discloses, Korn (2004), Kwon,
Newman, and Zang (2009), and Einhorn and Ziv (2012) study settings where a single firm
decides whether to disclose potentially biased information. In these settings, the firm with-
holds suffi ciently bad news and, conditional on disclosure, the market can perfectly back out
any bias because it is informed about the firm’s incentives. Korn (2004) finds that as the
cost of biasing becomes very low (very high) a no-disclosure equilibrium arises (a truthful,
full-disclosure equilibrium arises). Because firm values are drawn from a finite interval, a
partly separating equilibrium exists for some costs of misreporting where firms with low
firm values do not disclose, firms with intermediate values disclose biased reports, and firms
with high values disclose the upper threshold. Einhorn and Ziv (2012) allows for non-linear
equilibria and shows that the amount of bias increases in the privately observed information.
Similarly, Beyer and Guttman (2012) assumes that a firm privately observes the pro-
3 Stocken (2012) and Bertomeu (2013), respectively, provide a review and an overview of the literature.
4 Other reasons to prevent perfect unraveling of bias include strategic pooling (e.g., Guttman, Kadan,
and Kandel, 2006), probabilistic earnings management (e.g., Gao, 2013 or Laux and Stocken, 2012), and
incentives to manage earnings over time (e.g., Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002).
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ductivity of an investment opportunity, then chooses the firm’s investment level, and finally
decides whether to (truthfully) publish the level of investment. The firm overinvests (real
manipulation) in the attempt to make investors believe that the investment productivity is
higher. The analysis shows that while firms with low and high productivity invest in prof-
itable new investments, firms with intermediate forego the investment opportunity due to
the interaction between disclosure and investment.
There are few exceptions to the single-firm assumption. These papers either assume that
disclosure of information is truthful or that it is mandatory. Dye and Sridhar (1995) considers
truthful ex post disclosure by multiple firms where the information endowment by firms is
unknown to the public and the receipt of information is positively correlated across firms. In
this setting, disclosure herding arises; when one firm discloses information, the probability
that other firms disclose increases. Similar to our results, Dye and Sridhar predict that a
firm is less likely to disclose when more other firms with correlated cash flows disclose. Our
model, as well as Dye and Sridhar (1995), assumes that firms simultaneously decide whether
to disclose a report. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012) studies truthful ex post disclosure
where two firms sequentially choose whether to disclose. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter find
that the firms’propensity to issue reports depends on the extent and sign of their correlation.
Bagnoli and Watts (2010) and Fischer and Verrecchia (2004) analyze bias in settings with
multiple firms who engage in product market competition. Strobl (2013) investigates cost
of capital implications from firms’biasing behavior in a setting where a given number of
firms have to disclose earnings. Finally, while Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010) does not
investigate multiple firms, it allows for multiple actors by investigating a setting where a
biased report is analyzed, modified, and potentially biased by an audit committee.
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2 The Model
We consider a one-period disclosure-bias game withN risk-neutral, homogeneous firms out of
which M firms commit to disclose potentially biased information in a perfectly competitive
market with risk-neutral investors. Each of these firms yields a terminal value of ṽi, i =
1, ..., N , where the common priors for ṽi are that each ṽi has a normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance σ2. In addition, we assume that the covariance between any ṽi and any
ṽj, i 6= j, is ρσ2. During the period, firms privately observe a noisy measure of earnings,
ẽi = ṽi + ñi, where it is common knowledge that the ñi are independent and identically
distributed, each from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance η. After observing
earnings, M firms disclose information. Unlike firm i, the market and the other firms do not
observe the realization of ẽi. Consequently, the market price of firm i is a function of the
market’s prior beliefs, as well as firms’reports. As firms’cash flows are correlated, investors
use all available reports to determine the price of firm i. Consistent with the discussion in
the introduction, we assume that firms commit either to disclose or withhold the information
before they observe the realization of ẽi. This implies that whether a firm issues a report
does not, by itself, change investors’expectations about any firm’s future cash flow.
Let Pi represent the market price of firm i and let ȳ = {y1, y2, ..., yM} be the set of firms’
reports. Because we assume that the market is perfectly competitive and risk-neutral, the
price of firm i is the rational expectation of its terminal value, ṽi, conditioned upon the set
of reports, ȳ:
Pi = E [ṽi|ȳ] . (1)
We assume that firm i has some discretion over the accounting for the report and can use
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that discretion to disclose the observed earnings, ẽi, or to report some other number. We
interpret the difference between the observed earnings and the number actually disclosed
as “bias” in the report. Formally, conditional on firm i observing earnings of ẽi = ei, the
disclosed report, yi , equals ei + bi where bi is the bias firm i introduces.
Following Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), we assume that in choosing a level of bias, firm
i attempts to maximize its objective function, which we characterize by the expression:
Ui = xiPi −
c
2
b2i −K, (2)
where x̃i = xi is the realization of a random event that firm i alone observes, Pi is the market
price for the firm, c is some known positive parameter, c
2
b2i represents the known cost of bias
to firm i, and K is a fixed cost the firm bears when disclosing information. Similar to the
broad disclosure literature, we interpret K as proprietary costs or verification costs.5 As
noted above, the utility function in eqn. (2) reflects a firm’s desire to manage its price. We
refer to the firm here as a representation of the board and/or managers who make the actual
disclosure decisions. That x̃i is a random variable reflects the idea that price preferences can
vary over time.
We assume that it is common knowledge that the variables x̃i are identically distributed
with a normal distribution with mean µ and variance θ, and that they are independent of
ñi and ṽi. Given its inability to discern the firm’s precise preferences, the market can only
conjecture the extent to which the firm has incentives to inflate or deflate expectations.
Note that as we assume x̃i has a normal distribution, its realization can be either positive
5 See, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012), or Verrecchia
(1983).
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or negative, where the latter captures situations in which firms prefer to deflate prices.
We summarize the element of time in our model as follows. At t = 0 each firm commits
to either issuing a report or not. At t = 1 each firm receives a private earnings signal, M
firms that (at t = 0) committed to disclose a (potentially biased) report do so and prices
are set. Finally, at t = 2 uncertainty unravels. We solve the model by backward induction,
starting with the equilibrium to the disclosure-bias game when M firms commit to disclose.
3 A Linear Equilibrium
3.1 The Equilibrium at t = 1
In this section we construct an equilibrium to our disclosure-bias game. We restrict our
analysis to linear equilibria (i.e., prices that are linear in ȳ and bias strategies that are
linear in ei and xi) because they are easily characterized and yield compelling intuition.
An equilibrium at t = 1 consists of a bias function for each of the firms, bi (ei, xi), and M
pricing functions for the market, Pi, such that three conditions are satisfied. First, firm i’s
choice of bias for each realization {ei, xi}, bi (ei, xi), solves its optimization problem given
its conjecture as to the market response. Second, firm i’s market price equals the expected
firm value, ṽi, based on all reports ȳ, and a conjecture about the bias strategy of each firm
type. Third, expectations are met in equilibrium. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
a firm’s commitment to either disclose or withhold a report is observable both by the market
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and the other firms. Thus, we conjecture an equilibrium of the form:
bi (ei, xi) = λiy + λieei + λixxi, and (3)
Pi (ȳ) = α +
M∑
j=1
βijyj. (4)
We use firm i’s optimization problem and the market-pricing function for firm i to prove
that there exists a unique linear equilibrium.
A Firm’s Problem at t = 1: We briefly derive the biasing strategies and the market
pricing functions as they mainly follow Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). To begin, suppose
that firm i conjectures that the price of his firm based on all reports, ȳ, is of the form given
by eqn. (4) with conjectured values of α̂ and β̂ij∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}. The linear conjecture
about the pricing function, coupled with the objective function in eqn. (2), implies that firm
i’s objective is strictly concave in bi. Thus, the firm’s optimal bias is given by the first-order
condition, which yields:
bi (ei, xi) =
β̂ii
c
xi (5)
for all {ei, xi}. This implies that λiy = λie = 0 and λix = β̂ii/c. Different from Fischer
and Verrecchia (2000), we allow multiple firms to disclose and bias. However, as we assume
that prices are a linear function of all disclosed reports, the difference between two reports
is irrelevant for investors and firms. That is, firm i ignores the reports of all other firms and
the level of its own price when introducing bias. This indicates that if β̂ii = β̂jj, firms i and
j react in the same way to their individual observations of x̃i and x̃j. Note that because
a firm privately observes its earnings signal, it has an information advantage over investors
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about all firms’terminal values. However, as the bias chosen by firm i is independent of the
earnings signal, no firm has an information advantage about the bias chosen by any other
firm.
Market Pricing Function: Now we turn to the market pricing function. Assume a con-
jectured bias function of the form specified by eqns. (3) and (5).6 The market price of firm
i is equal to the expectation of firm i’s terminal value conditional on all reports:
Pi = αi + β1yi + β2
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
yj, where (6)
α = − (β1 + (M − 1) β2) λ̂ixµ, (7)
β1 =
σ2
Q1
(
σ2 (1− ρ) (1 + (M − 1) ρ) + η + λ2ixθ
)
, (8)
β2 =
ρσ2
Q1
(
η + λ2ixθ
)
, and (9)
Q1 =
(
σ2 (1 + (M − 1) ρ) + η + λ2ixθ
) (
σ2 (1− ρ) + η + λ2ixθ
)
. (10)
Intuitively, eqn. (6) provides the expression for firm value that results from regressing the
terminal value of firm i, ṽi, on the set of reports, ȳ. Note that the pricing function is indeed
linear in firms’reports. Also note that the weight a firm’s report receives in its price is the
same for all firms (i.e., βii = β1 for all i); furthermore, all report other than firm i’s receive
equal weight in Pi (i.e., βij = β2 for all i 6= j). This follows from our assumption that ex ante
all firms are homogeneous (i.e., σ2i = σ
2
j = σ
2 and Cov [ṽi, ṽj] = Cov [ṽi, ṽk] = ρσ2) such that
the information about firm i provided by yj is as valuable to investors as the information
provided by yk, where j, k 6= i. As βii = β1 for all i, each firm’s response to a realization of
6 Note that eqn. (5) implies that λiy = 0, λie = 0, and λix =
β̂ii
c .in eqn. (3). Because the first two results
hold regardless of the conjecture about the linear-pricing function, we restrict both to 0 for the remainder
of the analysis.
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x̃i is the same for all firms (i.e., λix = λx for all i).
Similar to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), the conjectured coeffi cient on the realization of
x̃i in the firms’bias function, λ̂x, captures the conjectured extent of bias. Because biasing
activities add noise to the reports, from the market’s perspective, the market sensitivity to
firm i’s report in its price, β1, decreases when the market believes that the firm is biasing to
a greater extent. Our assumption that all firms are homogeneous, however, implies that as
|λ̂x| becomes larger, more of the variance of all reports is attributable to x̃i. At the extremes,
when the market believes reports manifest no bias, λ̂x → 0, the weight in price is maximized.
When the market believes that bias is unbounded, |λ̂x| → ∞, the firms’reports do not affect
prices.
To derive the equilibrium, we replace the conjectures in eqns. (5) and (6) with their
equilibrium values and then show that the four equations have a unique solution. Note
that eqns. (5), (7), and (9) imply that α and β2 are unique functions of λx and/or β1.
Furthermore, from eqn. (5), it is easy to see that λx can be written as a unique function of
β1. This implies that for there to be a unique solution, there must exist a unique value for
β1 that solves eqns. (5) and (8). Solving eqns. (3) and (5) for λx and substituting it in for
λx in eqn. (8) provides the following equilibrium condition
0 = F (β1) = β1 −
c2σ2
Q2
(
c2σ2 (1− ρ) (1 + (M − 1) ρ) + c2η + β21θ
)
, (11)
with Q2 =
(
c2σ2 (1 + (M − 1) ρ) + c2η + β21θ
) (
c2σ2 (1− ρ) + c2η + β21θ
)
. Note that the un-
certainty about firms’ preferences is crucial for biasing activities to affect the weight of
reports in price. If this was not the case, i.e. θ = 0, the market sensitivity is identical to
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that attained when firms are constrained to disclose the observed earnings signal (while firms
would still introduce bias as long as µ 6= 0, this will be perfectly anticipated by the market
and thus taken out).
Finally, note that F (β1) has a unique positive solution for β1 when the number of firms
that disclose is exogenous. This case essentially reflects Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) with
multiple firms. Accordingly, the characteristics of the equilibrium and the comparative
statics from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) still apply. Specifically, β1 is decreasing in the
uncertainty about firms’preferences, constant in the expected value of preferences, increasing
in the quality of the earnings observed by firms and the prior uncertainty regarding terminal
value, and increasing in the marginal cost of bias.
In addition to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), β1 is decreasing in the correlation across
cash flows and in the number of firms that disclose.7 An increase in the correlation among
firms’cash flows increases the amount of information an investor can glean about the terminal
cash flow of a firm from any other firm’s report. This implies that the weight the market
assigns to firm j’s report when evaluating firm i increases, and hence the weight on firm
i’s own report decreases. In the limit (i.e., ρ → 1), the weight on both firms’reports is
identical: that is, β1 → β2, which can be seen by setting ρ = 1 in eqns. (8) and (9). This
result arises from our assumption that all firms are homogeneous, and hence the quality of,
and the bias in, reports is the same. Similarly, the more firms, M , that issue a report, the
more information that is available for the market to assess the value of a firm. This leads to
a lower market sensitivity.
7 Table 2 summarizes all relevant comparative static results for both an exogenous and an endogenous
number of firms that disclose.
11
While this discussion indicates that extending Fischer and Verrecchia to multiple firms
does not change the results, it also indicates that the number of disclosing firms has an effect
on the equilibrium. The main contribution of our model is to discuss the incentives that
firms have to disclose information. Specifically, we assume that firms anticipate their interest
in managing their stock price. Because variations in β1 affect the extent to which firms can
manage prices, these variations also affect the incentives to disclose information in the first
place. The following subsection investigates firms’decision to disclose information.
3.2 The Equilibrium at t = 0
In order to investigate the number of firms that disclose reports and its effect on the results
derived above, we first characterize a firm’s expected utility when disclosing a (potentially
biased) report. Here we assume that (i) a firm faces additional proprietary cost of K from
disclosure; (ii) that the commitment to disclose is made before observing the realizations of
ẽi and x̃i; and (iii) that firms commit to disclose if they expect to profit from the option to
manage their price. The equilibrium concept we apply is similar to the one in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980): if the expected utility of a firm that commits to disclose is higher than the
expected utility of a firm that commits not to disclose, one of the latter will also commit to
disclose.8 With these assumptions, using the equilibrium condition that bi = xi (β1/c), the
ex ante utility of firm i when committing to issue a report is:
E
[
x̃iPi −
c
2
b̃2i −K
]
=
β21
2c
(
θ − µ2
)
−K. (12)
8 Similar to the investors in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), all firms in our model are homogeneous ex
ante; thus, which specific firms commit to disclose is irrelevant.
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In contrast, if firm i does not disclose a report, then its ex ante expected utility is given by:
E
[
x̃i
(
α + β2
M∑
j=1
(
b̃j + ẽj
))]
= 0. (13)
Eqn. (12) provides some further insight to our formulation of the benefits and costs of
disclosing information. Committing to disclose allows a firm to bias this disclosure so that
it can manage the price in response to its preferences. The ability to manage prices comes
at a cost that is twofold: 1) the fixed cost K, and 2) the direct cost of introducing bias 1
2
cb2i .
As investors correct for any expected bias, µ negatively enters the expected utility, similar
to the deadweight cost in the signal-jamming literature (e.g., Stein, 1989).9 However, the
commitment to disclose allows the firm to manage price in response to its preferences x̃.
Managing prices, in turn, becomes more valuable as the firm faces higher uncertainty about
its future preferences.10
It follows from eqns. (12) and (13) that the firm prefers disclosure whenever β21
θ−µ2
2c
−K >
0, which implies that following condition has to hold:
θ > µ2. (14)
As Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) notes, eqn. (14) can be thought of as capturing the
uncertainty about whether firms will try to inflate or deflate prices relative to the expected
9 If investors did not expect firms to introduce bias (i.e., if α = 0), then both θ and µ would increase the
benefit of disclosure to the firm.
10 See Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the ex ante benefits of biasing.
To strengthen the link between our model and the notion that firms attempt to “manage expectations”
one could assume that the firms benefit whenever their preferences deviate from expectations, i.e., when
UM = (x̃i − µ)Pi − c2b
2
i . In this case the above condition would reduce to β
2
1
θ
2c −K = 0.
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bias. Specifically, when θ is large or when µ2 is close to 0, the probability that firms inflate
their reports (and the respective prices) and the probability that firms deflate their reports
move closer together (i.e., each probability approaches one-half). With this interpretation,
eqn. (14) suggests that when ex ante uncertainty about types is large (θ is large or µ is close
to 0), firms benefit from the option to bias. On the other hand, when firms almost always
desire higher or lower prices (i.e., θ is small or µ is far from 0), investors can back out almost
all bias from the reports, which makes the ex ante returns to biasing behavior negative.
As the option to move price in the preferred direction is the only benefit of disclosure
in our model, the uncertainty about firms’incentives has to be suffi ciently high (i.e., eqn.
(14) has to hold) for a firm to provide a report: if θ < µ2, a firm incurs negative expected
utility from disclosing a report such that no firm would commit to disclosure. For the
remainder of the analysis we assume θ > µ2. Alternatively, in Dye and Sridhar (2008) the
market knows the firms’price preferences but is uncertain about the cost of manipulation.
When withholding disclosure eliminates the cost of manipulation, all firms would prefer
to not disclose (because a firm’s ex ante expected price is independent of the disclosure).
That is, a firm prefers to withhold information when this eliminates the preference (cost)
uncertainty.11 We argue that it is realistic to assume that firms have an interest in managing
their prices (see, for example, Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; and Rogers and Stocken, 2005).
While we provide empirical guidance under the assumption that θ > µ2, whether the benefit
of disclosure in managing stock price outweighs the cost of manipulation is an empirical
question.
11 For example, assume that the uncertainty in the cost of manipulation represents uncertainty about
when it is costly to not walk expectations up or down. In this case, non-disclosure could be interpreted as
not managing expectations and the firm faces a cost in the non-disclosure case.
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We assume that there are N firms in the economy out of which M firms commit to
disclose. In order to avoid a trivial solution we assume that N > M . In equilibrium
expected utility from disclosure has to equal the expected utility from not disclosing, which,
following eqn. (13), equals zero:
β̂
2
1
θ − µ2
2c
−K = 0. (15)
Since at the time a manager decides whether to issue a report he does not know how many
firms will decide to do so, β̂1 in eqn. (15) is a function of the expectation about the number
of firms that decide to disclose, M̂ . Expectations have to be met in equilibrium, such that
M̂ = M has to hold.
In the last subsection we developed the intuition for why the equilibrium in market pricing
and managerial biasing at t = 1 can be written as an equilibrium in β1. Combined with the
requirement that β̂1 = β1 and eqn. (15), the resulting equilibrium is a pair {β1,M} that
solves eqns. (11) and (15). From eqn. (11) it is obvious that β1 is a function of the exogenous
parameters as well as M ; this is the case because the extent to which investors use a firm’s
report depends on the quality of information they can glean from it, and also depends on
the amount of information they can glean from all other reports. The more information is
available, the less weight investors place on any single report. This logically implies that β1
decreases in M . Eqn. (15) then shows that the number of firms that commit to disclose will
adjust such that β1 =
√
K 2c
θ−µ2 .
From eqn. (15), it is straightforward that an exogenous increase in β1 will increase
the benefit of disclosure, which, in turn, should increase M . On the other hand, when the
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number of issued reports increases, investors can use more information and, thus, potentially
decrease the weight on any specific firm’s report. These two effects introduce a tension into
the model and can yield a solution where some but not all firms commit to disclose.
Finally, from eqn. (15), it is easy to see that β1 can be written as a unique function of
the exogenous parameters. We complete the proof by taking the solution for β1 from eqn.
(15), substituting it in eqn. (11), and then showing that the resulting equation has a unique
solution for M : the resulting equilibrium condition for M is given by G (M) = 0, where
G (M) =
√
cX − cσ2 cη +Xθ + cσ
2 (1− ρ) (1 + (M − 1) ρ)
(cη +Xθ + cσ2 (1 + (M − 1) ρ)) (cη +Xθ + cσ2 (1− ρ)) (16)
and X = 2K
θ−µ2 . It is straightforward to see that eqn. (16) is strictly increasing in M . This
indicates that if G (M = 0) < 0 and G (M = N) > 0, there exists a unique solution for M
such that G (M) = 0. The lower and upper bound on the exogenous parameters indicate
that if, for example, the fixed cost of disclosure, K, is too high (low), no firm (all firms) will
commit to disclose and, thus, no interior solution exists. Proposition 1 shows the existence
of a linear equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium for the disclosure-bias game: P (ȳ) =
α + β1yi + β2
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
yj and bi (ei, xi) = λy + λeei + λxxi, where M and β1 solve G (M) = 0,
β21
θ−µ2
2c
= K, α = − (β1 + (M − 1) β2)λxµ, β2 = ρσ
2
Q1
(
η + λ2xθ
)
, λy = 0, λe = 0, λx =
β1
c
, and Q1 =
(
σ2 (1 + (M − 1) ρ) + η + λ2xθ
) (
σ2 (1− ρ) + η + λ2xθ
)
if G (M = 0) < 0 and
G (M = N) > 0.
Note that, similar to Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) and Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012),
when the firms’ cash flows are not correlated, the game reduces to a single-firm game
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because eqn. (16) is independent of M when we substitute ρ = 0. The lower bound
on the exogenous parameters indicates that when the cost of disclosure, K, is too high
(
√
2cK
θ−µ2 > cσ
2 Xθ+cη+cσ
2(1−ρ)2
(Xθ+cη+cσ2(1−ρ))2 ), no firm commits to disclose. The upper bound suggests
that when there are too few firms in the industry (N is too small) or when the cost of dis-
closure is too small (
√
2cK
θ−µ2 <
cσ2(1−ρ)
cσ2(1−ρ)+cη+Xθ , when N and M approach infinity), all firms
commit to disclose. In the latter situation, the analysis from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000)
applies, as discussed above.
Finally, in the knife edge case of perfect correlation, ρ = 1, all reports are equally valuable
to the investors of a specific firm such that β1 = β2 = β. In this situation, the condition F (β)
from eqn. (11) reduces to β = σ
2
Mσ2+η+(β/c)2θ
. This condition is similar to the one in Fischer
and Verrecchia (2000), adjusted for the number of reports. That is, the more reports are
available, the lower the weight on any specific report (via the termMσ2 in the denominator).
This reduces the incentives to bias, which makes reports less noisy (via the term (β/c)2 θ).
The entry condition from eqn. (15) remains unchanged such that the equilibrium condition
from eqn. (16) reduces to
√
cX = cσ
2
cσ2M+cη+Xθ
. We discuss comparative statics of the general
case in the following section.
4 Empirical Implications
Treating the number of firms that disclose as endogenous provides a countervailing force
to the results documented in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). Intuitively, the countervailing
force arises because changes in exogenous parameters that make it easier to bias the report
also make it more appealing to disclose a report. While the direct effect (more biasing) leads
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to less informative reports, the increase in the number of disclosed reports provides more
information to investors. In this section we provide empirical implications by characterizing
the solution to our model.
4.1 The Number of Firms in Equilibrium
Before providing predictions on the coeffi cients in a linear regression of reports on price, we
investigate the number of firms that choose to disclose in equilibrium. Corollary 1 summarizes
comparative static results for M in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 When firms can choose whether to disclose, the number of firms that choose
to do so: (i), decreases in the expected value of firms’preferences and the proprietary cost
of disclosure; (ii) increases in the uncertainty about firms’preferences; (iii) increases in the
quality of the earnings observed by the firms and the prior uncertainty regarding terminal
value; (iv) decreases in the correlation across cash flows; and (v) is ambiguous with respect
to the marginal cost of bias.
Note that the results in Corollary 1 are driven by changes in the expected utility from
disclosing a report. From eqn. (15) it is straightforward to see that the number of firms,
M , itself enters the expected benefit of disclosure only through its effect on the market
response to disclosure, β1. This implies that while more firms choose to issue a report when
the expected benefit increases (i.e., θ increases or µ decreases) or the cost, K, decreases,
there is also an indirect effect of changes in exogenous parameters. This indirect effect exists
because changes in parameters also lead to changes in β1. For example, from eqn. (11) we
can infer that an increase in θ increases the noise in the disclosed reports, which decreases
18
the weight investors place on the report. As Corollary 1 shows, the direct effect of increasing
the expected utility dominates the indirect effect of a decrease in β1.
The 4th, 5th, and 6th comparative static results (i.e., dM/dη, dM/dσ2, and dM/dρ),
however, are driven by the indirect effect on β1. As discussed above, with an exogenous
determination of M , β1 decreases in η and ρ (increases in σ
2). This reduces (increases) the
expected benefit of disclosure and decreases (increases) M . The final result shows that the
effect of an increase in the marginal cost of bias, c, can increase or decrease the number of
firms that disclose a report in equilibrium. Again, there is a direct effect (a higher c decreases
the expected utility from disclosure) and an indirect effect (ceteris paribus, c increases β1
as reports become less biased, thereby increasing the expected utility). Which of these
dominates depends on the value of the model’s fundamental parameters.
While the effect of c on M is ambiguous, we know that for suffi ciently small values of
c the number of firms that disclose increases as c increases, whereas for suffi ciently large
values of c the number of firms that disclose decreases as c increases. The intuition for this
is as follows, for c = 0 investors treat all reports as pure noise such that no firm has an
incentive to disclose a report. When c increases investors start to include the reports in their
valuation, this provides incentives for firms to disclose. As c increases further, it becomes
increasingly costly for firms to manage their stock price, which reduces their incentives to
disclose information.
Note that the comparative static results in Corollary 1 are a direct result of changes in a
firm’s expected utility from disclosing a report. This implies that the corollary also speaks
to which firms in an industry are more likely to disclose. However, firm heterogeneity can
reduce the impact of the endogenous disclosure decision. For example, assume some firms
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have very low proprietary costs and the others have very high costs. In this situation, small
changes in exogenous parameters have no effect on the equilibrium when all low cost but no
high cost firms disclose. That is, the endogenous entry condition, eqn. (15), would not bind
and local comparative statics are, similar to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), determined by
eqn. (11).
The empirical literature on the propensity of firms to issue management forecasts in the
presence of proprietary costs is based on Verrecchia (1983) and finds mixed results (e.g., Ali,
Klasa, and Yeung, 2014; and Li, 2010). However, consistent with our setting of a commitment
to disclose, Ali et al also document that firms prefer private over public placements to raise
funds when proprietary costs are higher.
In the ex post disclosure literature, Einhorn (2007) predicts that a firm can withhold
information (is less likely to disclose) when investors are uncertain about whether the firm
prefers to increase or decrease stock price. Corollary 1 suggests the opposite: more firms
disclose when the uncertainty about firms’preferences is higher. The crucial difference is that
we study a commitment to disclose whereas Einhorn investigates discretionary disclosure.
Similarly, in a model of multi period ex post disclosure, Beyer and Dye (2012) suggest that as
future cash flows become more volatile, more firms will disclose contemporaneous information
to develop a reputation for being “forthcoming.”The reputation provides managers with a
the ability to withhold more negative information (that is, managers can better manage
future stock prices). In Beyer and Dye (2012) fewer managers disclose early as the average
probability of being forthcoming decreases. While this is a result of different economic forces,
it is similar to our result regarding the expected value of firms’preferences.
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In line with our results, Verrecchia (1990) predicts that an increase in cash flow uncer-
tainty leads to less disclosure. Empirically, Kim, Pandit, and Wasley (2014) suggests higher
cash flow uncertainty leads to a lower frequency of discretionary management earnings fore-
casts. Kim, et al. partly ascribe this finding to the negative impact of greater market
uncertainty on the quality of firms’private information. In our model (and in Verrecchia,
1990), the quality of privately observed information captures this aspect of the disclosure
decision. Higher cash flow uncertainty itself increases investors’interest in obtaining informa-
tion, which increases the value of disclosure. This highlights the importance of controlling for
the quality of firms’information when investigating the relation between market uncertainty
and the propensity to disclose.
Finally, Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer (2013) suggests that management forecasts con-
tain macroeconomic information. However, Bonsall at al. do not investigate whether firms
are more likely to issue forecasts when other firms’ forecasts are more informative about
systematic events.
4.2 Regression of Price on Reports
4.2.1 The Weight on a Firm’s Own Report
In our model, all reports provide information about one firm’s cash flows because all firms’
reports are correlated. In such a setting, it is a standard result that the incremental infor-
mation conveyed by one report decreases as more reports are available, such that an inverse
relation between M and β1 exists. From eqn. (15), however, it is straightforward that a
firm’s utility increases in β1, which suggests a complementary relation. This indicates that
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the comparative static results on β1 from the prior literature might be altered when firms
are allowed to choose whether to disclose or not. In what follows, we focus our discussion
on comparative statics that change as a result of allowing firms to choose whether they dis-
close. Corollary 2 summarizes comparative static results on the slope of a firm’s report in a
regression of its price on all available reports.
Corollary 2 When firms can choose whether to disclose, the weight of a firm’s report in its
price: (i) increases in the expected value of firms’preferences and the fixed cost of disclosure;
and (ii) is constant in the quality of the earnings observed by the firms, the prior uncertainty
regarding terminal value, and the correlation across cash flows.
Note the difference in comparative static results in Corollary 2 to the results in Fischer and
Verrecchia (2000). Specifically, while changes in exogenous parameters still have a direct
effect on the weight on a firm’s report at t = 1, they also have an indirect effect through
the number of firms that commit to disclose at t = 0. That is, while eqn. (11) describes the
direct effect of parameters on β1, eqn. (15), β
2
1
θ−µ2
2c
−K = 0, shows that M will adjust such
that changes in η, σ2, and ρ will not affect β1.
Furthermore, while increases in K and µ have no direct effect on β1, they reduce M
(see Corollary 1), which increases β1. That is, β1 increases in K and µ and has an inverse
relation to M . Finally, note that an increase in θ (or a decrease in c) decreases β1 when M
is constant. Because M increases in θ (decreases in c) the comparative statics from Fischer
and Verrecchia (2000) with respect to θ and c are amplified.
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4.2.2 The Weight on Other Firms’Reports
Different from models that focus on a single firm, we study a multi-firm game. Because firms
publish reports that are informative about all firms’cash flows, the market uses all reports
when pricing firm i. The existence of other information suggests that if a firm is expected
to introduce more bias (and hence the quality of the report decreases), investors rely less on
his report and increase the weight on other information. Because we assume that all firms
are homogeneous, however, an increase in the expected bias in firm i’s report comes with a
comparable increase in the expected bias in all other firms’reports; this reduces the weight
these reports receive in the price of firm i. When examining the weight of other information
in price, this indicates that there are two countervailing forces; these countervailing forces
make comparative static results on the slope of another firm’s report in a regression generally
ambiguous. To illustrate these forces, imagine a simpler setting where firms are unable to
introduce bias into their reports. The only source of noise in the disclosed reports is the
noise in firms’private information. When firms receive (and disclose) perfect information,
η = 0, investors only use a firm’s own report when determining price, i.e., β2 = 0. Increasing
the noise to η > 0 provides a role for other firms’reports such that β2 increases. However,
with an infinite level of noise investors will ignore all reports such that, again, β2 = 0.
In order to provide testable results, we investigate the ratio between the weight on another
firm’s report relative to the weight firm i’s own report, i.e.,
RW ≡ β2
β1
=
ρ (cη +Xθ)
cσ2 (1− ρ) (1 + (M − 1) ρ) + cη +Xθ , (17)
where X = 2K
θ−µ2 . Corollary 3 summarizes our results regarding the relative weights of other
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firms’reports and a firm’s own report in price when we treat M as: (a) endogenous and (b)
exogenous.
Corollary 3 When firms can choose whether to disclose, the ratio of the weight on all other
firms’ reports and the weight on a firm’s report in that firm’s price: (i) increases in the
expected value of managers’incentives and the fixed cost of disclosure; (ii) decreases in the
uncertainty about managers’incentives; and (iii) is ambiguous with respect to the marginal
cost of bias.
Corollary 2 shows that suffi ciently large changes in η, σ2, and ρ have no impact on β1
because they affect the number of firms such that the information that can be gleaned from
a specific firm’s report remains constant. However, this is not the case for the information
content of other reports such that changes in these parameters affect the relative weights
similar to a setting with a given number of reports. Corollary 3 shows that the endogenous
number of reports does, however, affect the comparative statics with respect to µ, K, θ, and
c. Because all reports, other than the firm’s own report, are perfect substitutes, an increase
in M decreases the relative weights, i.e., ∂ (β2/β1) /∂M < 0. This implies that the relative
weights increase in µ and K and decrease in θ. AsM can increase or decrease in c, the same
holds true for the relative weights.
4.3 Expected Bias
The bias a firm introduces into the report it provides to the market is determined by the
weight the market assigns to its report when determining his firm’s market value, the cost of
introducing bias, and the firm’s price-based incentives, i.e., bi = (β1/c)xi. Thus, the extent
24
of bias in a given report crucially depends on the firm’s (unobservable) preferences. As in
prior literature, however, we can make predictions on the expected bias in published reports,
where
E [bi] = (β1/c)E [xi] = (β1/c)µ. (18)
Clearly, with the potential exception of the result concerning the marginal cost of introducing
bias, the comparative static results from Corollary 2 will continue to hold. The sign of the
results, however, depends on the sign of the firms’expected preferences, µ. For the remainder
of our analysis, we assume that firms, on average, have a greater interest to inflate price (i.e.,
µ > 0), such that expected bias is increasing in the market sensitivity. While the comparative
static with respect to c changes relative to Corollary 2, it remains unchanged from the result
in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). That is, expected bias decreases in c. Similarly, expected
bias increases in the firms’expected price preferences. Here, the endogenous number of firms
that disclose amplifies the result in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) because as µ increases,
fewer firms disclose information, which implies that dβ1/dµ > 0.
Corollary 4 summarizes comparative static results on expected bias.
Corollary 4 Assume that the firms are more likely to inflate price (i.e., µ > 0). When firms
can choose whether to disclose, expected bias: (i) increases in the fixed cost of disclosure;
and (ii) is constant in the quality of the earnings observed by the firms, the prior uncertainty
regarding terminal value, and the correlation across cash flows.
Note that in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), expected bias increases in the quality of privately
observed earnings and the prior uncertainty. The reason is that both increase the information
content of disclosure and, thus, the incentives to bias. The endogenous entry offsets this such
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that expected bias is independent of the two parameter values.
The empirical evidence in Rogers and Stocken (2005) suggests that uncertainty about
the firms’preference increases expected bias. This is consistent with both our model and
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). However, we are not aware of empirical studies that examine
how the variables in Corollary 4 affect the average bias in disclosure.
4.4 Price effi ciency
The final results we derive consider the information content of issued reports or the degree
of “price effi ciency” (i.e., the extent to which prices reflect all relevant public and private
information). One measure of price effi ciency is the variance of terminal value conditional
upon the market price, V ar [ṽi|Pi], divided by the prior variance, σ2. This measure reflects
the proportion of uncertainty remaining after the disclosure. To perform the comparative
static analysis for price effi ciency, it is useful to focus on the proportion of variance revealed
by the reports:
V ≡ 1− V ar [ṽi|Pi]
σ2
. (19)
Corollary 5 summarizes comparative static results on price effi ciency.
Corollary 5 When firms can choose whether to disclose, price effi ciency: (i) decreases in
the expected value of firms’preferences and the fixed cost of disclosure; (ii) increases in the
uncertainty about firms’ preferences, (iii) is constant in the correlation across cash flows,
and (iv) is ambiguous with respect to the marginal cost of bias.
Corollary 1 suggests that greater disclosure about firms’preferences (e.g., managerial in-
centive plans) that reduces θ may, in turn, result in fewer value-relevant reports. While
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providing information about θ increases investors’understanding of the incentives to bias
makes any published report more value relevant, it causes fewer firms to commit to disclose.
Corollary 5 shows that the second effect dominates such that price effi ciency decreases. Two
similar forces are at work when the correlation of cash flows increases. With a given number
of available reports, price effi ciency increases with an increase in ρ. With an endogenous
number, both effects offset each other such that price effi ciency is constant at all points
where condition (15) holds with equality. Between these points, price effi ciency increases in
ρ: this is similar to the effect on expected bias.
Furthermore, Corollary 5 provides insights pertaining to the value relevance of firms’
disclosures. Settings with an exogenous number of disclosing firms predict that greater
enforcement of disclosure regulations, or stiffer penalties for violations of those regulations
(as represented by an increase in c), increase the value relevance of firms’disclosed reports.
Corollary 5 shows that this is not necessarily the case when the number of disclosing firms
is determined endogenously. Specifically, the comparative static can be expressed as follows
dV
dc
=
1
2σ2
(
2K
c (θ − µ2)θ − η
)√
2K
c (θ − µ2)c. (20)
Starting at c = 0, an increase in c increases price effi ciency (because 2K
c(θ−µ2)θ−η > 0 for small
c). However, as c increases the rate of increase in price effi ciency declines and, eventually,
price effi ciency decrease in c. That is, when the cost of bias exceeds the threshold cV = 2Kθ−µ2
θ
η
,
further increases in c deter a suffi cient number of firms from disclosing a report such that
prices become less effi cient. This analysis suggests that enforcement of disclosure regulations
helps price effi ciency only to a certain degree. Once the enforcement becomes too strong,
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further increases in enforcement reduce price effi ciency.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discuss bias in firms’disclosures in a multi-firm setting; this extends the
literature on bias in single-firm settings. We assume that the market cannot observe the
chosen bias and, additionally, is uncertain about a firm’s preferences as it relates to managing
its stock price. Our main innovation comes from treating the number of firms that disclose as
endogenous. We believe that this assumption is descriptive of many types of disclosure, given
that firms even have (some) influence on their exposure to mandatory disclosure regimes.
The model allows us to derive novel, and potentially testable, predictions. For example,
we show that when we treat the number of firms that disclose as endogenous, this number
increases in the prior uncertainty about firms’cash flows, and decreases in the correlation
across these cash flows. Further, we show that several empirical implications from the
setting with an exogenous number of firms do not continue to hold when the number of
firms is allowed to be endogenous. This highlights that the number of firms that disclose
information is an important variable to control for in empirical studies. In other words, some
of the predictions from a standard model of reporting bias are different for settings where
firms have to disclose and where they can choose whether to disclose.
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Appendix
Table 1 - Notation
ṽi ∼ N (0, σ2) final cash flow of firm i, with variance σ2
ρ correlation among the cash flows of firms i and j, i 6= j
ei = ṽi + ñi report about firm i’s cash flow
ñi ∼ N (0, η) measurement noise in report, with variance η
xi ∼ N (µ, θ) firm i’s interest in its price, with variance θ
µ expected value of firm i’s price preferences
K fixed cost of disclosing information
Table 1: Notation
Table 2 - Comparative Statics
Number of
firms, M∗
Response
coeffi cient,
β1
Relative
weight,
β2/β1
Expected
bias, E [bi]
Price effi -
ciency, V
M M∗ M M∗ M M∗ M M∗
Expected incentive, µ — 0 + 0 + + + 0 —
Proprietary cost, K — 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 —
Incentive uncertainty, θ + — — + — — — — +
Information quality, η−1 + + 0 — — + 0 + +
Cash flow uncertainty, σ2 + + 0 — — + 0 + +
Correlation, ρ — — 0 + + — 0 + 0
Bias cost, c —/+ + + — —/+ — — + —/+
Number of firms, M ∅ — ∅ + ∅ — ∅ + ∅
Table 2: Comparative statics with an exogenous number of reports, M , and an endogenous
number of reports, M∗.
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Proofs
Corollary 1
• Differentiating eqn. (16) with respect to θ yields:
∂G (M)
∂θ
= −1
2
√
2K
c
(θ − µ2)2
√
K c
θ−µ2
−2Kµ
2
c
(2Kθ + (θ − µ2) c (η + σ2 (1− ρ) (1 + (M − 1) ρ)))2
Q4
−2Kµ
2
c
+c2σ4ρ2 (θ − µ2)2 (1− ρ) (M − 1) (1− ρ+Mρ)
Q4
, with
Q4 =
(
2Kθ + c
(
η + σ2 − σ2ρ
) (
θ − µ2
))2 (
2Kθ + c
(
θ − µ2
) (
η + σ2 − σ2ρ+Mσ2ρ
))2
.
As ∂G(M)
∂M
> 0, the above implies that M is increasing in θ.
• Differentiating eqn. (16) with respect to X yields:
∂G (M)
∂X
=
c
2
√
Xc
+cθσ2
Mcσ2ρ (1− ρ) (2Xθ + 2cη + 2cσ2 (1− ρ) + (M − 1) cσ2ρ)
(cσ2 (1− ρ) + cη +Xθ + cσ2Mρ)2 (cσ2 (1− ρ) + cη +Xθ)2
+cθσ2
(Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1− 2ρ) (1− ρ))
(cσ2 (1− ρ) + cη +Xθ + cσ2Mρ)2 (cσ2 (1− ρ) + cη +Xθ)
.
Thus, M decreases in K and µ.
30
• Differentiating eqn. (16) with respect to η yields:
∂G (M)
∂η
=
c2σ2H (M)
(Xθ + cη + cσ2 − cσ2ρ)2 (Xθ + cη + cσ2 − cσ2ρ+Mcσ2ρ)2
, with
H (M) = Mcσ2ρ (1− ρ)
(
Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1− ρ+ (M − 1) ρ)
)
+
(
Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1− ρ) (1− ρ+ (M − 1) ρ)
) (
Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1− ρ)
)
.
Thus, M decreases in η.
• Differentiating eqn. (16) with respect to σ2 yields:
∂G (M)
∂σ2
=
−c (Xθ + cη)H (M)
(Xθ + cΣ + cη − cΣρ)2 (Xθ + cΣ + cη − cΣρ+McΣρ)2
, with
H (M) = Mcσ2ρ (1− ρ)
(
2Xθ + 2cσ2 + 2cη − 3cσ2ρ+Mcσ2ρ
)
+
(
Xθ + cσ2 + cη − 3cσ2ρ+ 2cσ2ρ2
) (
Xθ + cσ2 + cη − cσ2ρ
)
.
Thus, M increases in σ2.
• Differentiating (16) with respect to ρ yields:
∂G (M)
∂ρ
= c2σ4ρ
(M − 1) (Xθ + cη) (2Xθ + 2cη + 2cσ2 − 2cσ2ρ+Mcσ2ρ)
(Xθ + cη + cσ2 − cσ2ρ)2 (Xθ + cη + cσ2 − cσ2ρ+Mcσ2ρ)2
.
Thus, M decreases in ρ.
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• Differentiating (16) with respect to c yields:
∂G (M)
∂c
=
1
2
√
X√
c
− σ2Xθ (Xθ + cη + cσ
2 (1− ρ) (1 + (M − 1) ρ))2
(Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1− ρ))2 (Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1 + (M − 1) ρ))2
−σ2Xθ (cσ
2)
2
(1− ρ) ρ2 (M − 1) (1 + (M − 1) ρ)
(Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1− ρ))2 (Xθ + cη + cσ2 (1 + (M − 1) ρ))2
.
It can be shown that there exist conditions under which either ∂F (M)
∂c
> 0 or ∂F (M)
∂c
< 0.
Corollaries 2 - 5
Corollaries 2 - 5 are straightforward derivatives of the respective variables.
32
References
Aboody, D. and R. Kasznik (2000) CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate
Voluntary Disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 29, 73—100.
Admati, A.R. and P. Pfleiderer (2000) Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regula-
tion and Externalities, Review of Financial Studies 13, 479—519.
Ali, A., S. Klasa, and E. Yeung (2014) Industry Concentration and Corporate Disclosure
Policy, Journal of Accounting and Economics 58, 240—264.
Bagnoli, M. and S.G. Watts (2010) Oligopoly, Disclosure, and Earnings Management, Ac-
counting Review 85, 1191—1214.
Bertomeu, J. (2013) Discussion of Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital, Journal
of Accounting Research 51, 475—493.
Beyer, A. and R.E. Dye (2012) Reputation Management and the Disclosure of Earnings
Forecasts, Review of Accounting Studies 17, 877—912.
Beyer, A. and I. Guttman (2012) Voluntary Disclosure, Manipulation and Real Effects,
Journal of Accounting Research 50, 1—37.
Bonsall, S.B., Z. Bozanic, and P.E. Fischer (2013) What Do Management Earnings Fore-
casts Convey About the Macroeconomy?, Journal of Accounting Research 51, 225—266.
Caskey, J., V. Nagar, and P. Petacchi (2010) Reporting Bias with and Audit Committee,
Accounting Review 85, 447—481.
Chen, S., D. Matsumoto, and S. Rajgopal (2011) Is Silence Golden? An Empirical Analysis
of Firms that Stop Giving Quarterly Earnings Guidance, Journal of Accounting and
Economics 51, 134—150.
Cheynel, E. and C.B. Levine (2012) Analysts’ sale and distribution of non fundamental
information, Review of Accounting Studies 17, 352—388.
33
Dye, R.A. and S.S. Sridhar (1995) Industry-Wide Disclosure Dynamics, Journal of Account-
ing Research 33, 157—1743.
Dye, R.A. and S.S. Sridhar (2008) A positive theory of flexibility in accounting standards,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 312—333.
Einhorn, E. (2007) Voluntary disclosure under uncertainty about the reporting objective,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 245—274.
Einhorn, E. and A. Ziv (2012) Biased Voluntary Disclosure, Review of Accounting Studies
17, 420—442.
Fischer, P.E. and R.E. Verrecchia (2000) Reporting Bias, Accounting Review 75, 229—245.
Fischer, P.E. and R.E. Verrecchia (2004) Disclosure Bias, Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics 38, 223—250.
Gao, P. (2013) A Measurement Approach to Conservatism and Earnings Management,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 55, 251—268.
Gao, P. and P.J. Liang (2013) Informational Feedback, Adverse Selection, and Optimal
Disclosure Policy, Journal of Accounting Research 51, 1133—1158.
Goex, R.F. and A. Wagenhofer (2009) Optimal impairment rules, Journal of Accounting
and Economics 48, 2—16.
Grossman, S.J. and J.E. Stiglitz (1980) On the Impossibility of Informationally Effi cient
Markets, American Economic Review 70, 393—408.
Guttman, I., O. Kadan, and E. Kandel (2006) A Rational Expectations Theory of Kinks
in Financial Reporting, Accounting Review 81, 811—848.
Jorgensen, B.N. and M.T. Kirschenheiter (2012) Interactive Discretionary Disclosures, Con-
temporary Accounting Research 28, 382—397.
34
Kim, K., S. Pandit, and C.E. Wasley (2014) Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Management
Earnings Forecasts, working paper.
Kirschenheiter, M.T. and N.D. Melumad (2002) Can “Big Bath” and Earnings Smooth-
ing Co-exist as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies? Journal of Accounting
Research 40, 761—796.
Korn, E. (2004) Voluntary Disclosure of Partially Verifiable Information, Schmalenbach
Business Review 56, 139—63.
Kwon, Y.K., D.P. Newman, and Y. Zang (2009) The Effects of Accounting Report Quality
on the Bias in and Likelihood of Management Disclosures, working paper.
Laux, V. and P.C. Stocken (2012) Managerial Reporting, Overoptimism, and Litigation
Risk, Journal of Accounting and Economics 53, 577—591.
Li, X. (2010) The Impacts of Product Market Competition on the Quantity and Quality of
Voluntary Disclosures, Review of Accounting Studies 15, 663—711.
Li, E.X., C.E. Wasley, and J.L. Zimmerman (2012) Should Management Earnings Guid-
ance be Pooled? Classifying Management Earnings Guidance into Capital Market,
Opportunistic, and Disclose or Abstain Rationales: Implications for Research, working
paper.
Michaeli, B. (2014) Divide and Inform: Rationing Information to Facilitate Persuasion,
working paper.
Rogers, J.L. and P.C. Stocken (2005) Credibility of Management Forecasts, Accounting
Review 80, 1233—1260.
Stein, J.C. (1989) Effi cient Capital Markets, Ineffi cient Firms: AModel of Myopic Corporate
Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 655—669.
35
Stocken P.C. (2012), Strategic Accounting Disclosure, Foundations and Trends in Account-
ing 7, 197—291.
Strobl, G. (2013) Earnings Manipulation and the Cost of Capital, Journal of Accounting
Research 51, 449—473.
Tang, M. (2012) What Guides the Guidance? An Empirical Examination of the Dynamic
Disclosure Theory, working paper.
Verrecchia, R.E. (1983) Discretionary Disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 5,
179—194.
Verrecchia, R.E. (1990) Information Quality and Discretionary Disclosure, Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics 12, 365—380.
36
